Abstract-Auction has been used to allocate resources or tasks to processes, machines or other autonomous entities in distributed systems. When different bidders have different demands and valuations on different types of resources or tasks, the auction becomes a combinatorial auction (CA), for which finding an optimal auction result that maximizes total winning bid is NP-hard. Many time-efficient approximations to this problem work with a bid ranking function (BRF). However, existing approximations are all centralized and mostly for single-unit resource. In this paper, we propose the first decentralized CA schemes for multi-unit resources. It includes a BRF-based winner determination scheme that enables every agent to locally compute a critical bid value for her to win the CA and accordingly take her best response to other agent's win declaration. It also includes a critical-value-based pricing scheme for each winner to locally compute her payment. We analyze stabilization, correctness, and consistency properties of the proposed approach. Simulation results confirms that the proposed approach identifies exactly the same set of winners as the centralized counterpart regardless of initial bid setting, but at the cost of lower total winning bid and payment.
I. INTRODUCTION
Auction is a trading process that allows someone with items to sell (i.e., a seller) to identify potential buyers and the prices the buyers are willing to pay. We may use auctions as resource and task allocation schemes. Unlike conventional approaches that assume zero or fixed cost of resource or task, auctionbased approaches can allocate resource/task to requesters in a way that reflects actual demand and supply conditions. For this reason, auctions have been used to allocate different types of resources or tasks to a fleet of autonomous, self-interest agents. Existing examples include but not limited to allocations of wireless spectrum [1] , [2] , cloud resource [3] , [4] , [5] , [6] , [7] , and tasks of robots [8] , [9] .
The key to the success of auction-based resource allocations is to identify bidders' valuations on resources. Generally speaking, different requesters have different valuations on the same resource. For example, a cloud user with a computationintensive task may value computation resource more than other users with storage-intensive tasks. One possible goal of auction design is to maximize the aggregated valuation from all winning bidders, a quantity called social welfare. An auction mechanism that always maximizes the social welfare is economically efficient, which is desirable when we have to maximize the utilities of requesters rather than the revenue of the seller.
A challenge to the design of an economically-efficient mechanism is that bidder's valuations on resources are considered local and private (i.e., not revealed to other bidders and the auctioneer who conducts the auction). The auctioneer can only get aware of such information indirectly through bid values. In this regard, bids indicate bidder's preferences for the items to sell. But bids are beyond preferences, because bids should somehow be associated with payments to prevent bidders that do not value an item the most from winning it by placing an excessive bid. If every bidder places a bid that is equivalent to her true valuation, a property called truthful bidding, the social welfare is equivalent to the collection of bids from all winners. Therefore, an auction mechanism is economically efficient if it both ensures truthful bidding and maximizes the collection of bids from all winners.
In the simplest form of auction, there is only item to sell. Some studies assumed a single type of resource with multiple supplying units [10] , [4] , [7] . We consider a more general form called combinatorial auction (CA) [11] , [12] , where more than one types of items are allocated to bidders at a time via an auction. A typical example is in cloud environment, where we have computation, memory, storage, network, and other types of resources. Each agent (i.e., bidder) has an interest in and thus places a bid on a particular combination of items (in the form of virtual machines, for example). Unlike what happens in a single-item auction, more than one agents could be winners in a CA (if these agents have nonconflicting interests). In a single-unit CA, there is only one instance for each type of item. In a multi-unit CA, where there can be multiple identical instances for one type of item, two or more agents can be winners at the same time even if they have conflicting interests. Identifying a feasible set of winning bids with the highest total bid in CA is a task called winner determination problem (WDP). WDP is NPhard even for single-unit CA [11] . So most existing approaches are approximations. We particularly consider approximations that are based on a bid ranking function (BRF), which defines a total order on bid requests. BRF-based approximations are time efficient but cannot guarantee economic efficiency.
Another task of CA is pricing scheme, which decides the payment of each winner. A pricing scheme is incentive compatible if every agent's dominant strategy is to bid truthfully. Incentive-compatible pricing scheme together with an optimal winner determination can ensure economical efficiency. The most well-known incentive-compatible pricing scheme for CA is the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism [13] , [14] , [15] . VCG relies on the optimal solution to the winner determination problem, so it is not computationally feasible. We consider a computationally-efficient heuristic called criticalvalue-based payment that depends on the definition of the associated BRF. It has been proved that if the associated BRF is monotone, a critical-value-based payment is incentive compatible [16] .
Almost all CA approaches implicitly assume a single entity, i.e., an auctioneer, to conduct auctions. Such a centralized approach is not robust and scalable because the auctioneer is a single point of failure and can be a performance bottleneck. So some approaches attempt distributing the load of auctioneer to sets of brokers [17] , [18] . Another issue with centralized CA approach is that decentralized winner determination may be preferable when supplies of and requests for resources exhibit locality property as exemplified below.
• Resource is only accessible to "local" users. An example is wireless spectrum resource.
• Users only have interest in locally-accessible resource.
An example is virtualized resource provided by edge servers in mobile edge computing environment. In these cases, potential competitors contending for the same type of resource tend to cluster together and it is nature for they themselves to coordinately determine the set of resource winners. Furthermore, in applications like robot task allocations, it is more desirable to let robots themselves coordinate their tasks because, compared with a central coordination approach that decides a global task allocation, the decentralized approach has a shorter reaction time.
In this paper, we propose a decentralized BRF-based winner determination and associated pricing schemes for multi-unit CAs where bidders autonomously decide whether they themselves are winners and how much they should pay. This work is not just to duplicate or partition auctioneer's computation load to a set of participants. The key to the benefit and the feasibility of the decentralization is that only bidders that place bids on a common item have conflicting interests and thus need to interact with one another for winner determination. The competitions among bidders can be captured by a conflict graph, where bidders are nodes and there is an edge for each pair of competing bidders. Fig. 1 shows an example of conflict graph for seven bidders in a CA. Here, for bidding agent a 5 to determine whether she can win her bid, she only needs to know the bidding information and the status of her competitors (a 4 , a 6 , and a 7 ). Agent a 5 is free to declare her win in the CA without information from other bidders (a 1 , a 2 , and a 3 ). This suggests a localized, autonomous winner determination mechanism, which is more robust and scalable than a centralized one.
Without a centralized control, bidders in a decentralized CA have to exchange bidding information for collaborative winner determinations. Bidding protocols under this framework face several challenges. First, if bidders can gain extra payoff by having knowledge of other bids before they place their own bids, they may intentionally postpone their decision makings until they receive bidding information of their competitors. The consequence is that the whole system may enter a deadlock state simply because no bidder wants to place her bid first. Second, bidders progresses asynchronously due to the lack of a synchronization scheme among them. The non-deterministic interactions among bidders may not converge to a stabilized result without appropriate regulations. Third, even if the protocol reaches a stabilized outcome, the outcome may not be the same as that of the corresponding centralized counterpart using the same BRF.
A. Contribution and Organization
The contribution of this work is summarized as follows.
• We propose a protocol for WDP in multi-unit CA which works for any given BRF that is monotone. This protocol is deadlock free because it allows bidders to revise and update their bid requests whenever they want to react to other bidder's updates (as their best response). This protocol guarantees stabilization in the face of dynamic bidder interactions. For a specific BRF, the proposed decentralized approach can yield the same set of winners as the centralized counterpart, despite that the ranks of bid requests and payments may be different in the two approaches.
• The associated pricing scheme is no longer incentive compatible because bidders may change their bids after observing bidding information of others, i.e., it is not a static (one-shot) game. However, the proposed criticalvalue-based payment is still strategy-proof, meaning that no winner can decrease her payment by unilaterally manipulating her own bid. To the best knowledge of the authors, this is the first decentralized CA approach that possesses these properties. We have conducted extensive simulations to investigate the performance of the proposed approaches.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Sec. II covers the background and related work of the problem. In Sec. III, we present the proposed scheme in details and analyze its properties. Sec. IV contains the simulation results that confirm the advantage of our algorithm. The last section concludes this paper.
II. PROBLEM DEFINITION AND RELATED WORK
We consider a set of n bidding agents (bidders) A = {a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a n } and m different types of resources R = {r 1 , r 2 , . . . , r m }. Let q = (q 1 , q 2 , . . . , q m ) be a supply vector such that q i ≥ 1 is the number of identical instances of resource type r i . For single-unit CA, q i = 1 for all i. Each agent a i may submit a request vector s i = (s
where s j i ≤ q j is the number of instances of resource type r j requested by a i . For single-unit CA, s i reduces to a set (named bundle) S i ⊆ R. Each agent a i has an evaluation on s i denoted by v i (s i ), which is private. We do not allow for externalities, which means that v i (·) does not depend on any v j (·) with j = i. We also assume that agents are single-minded [16] , i.e., every agent a i is interested in only one particular request s i and does not accept any winning result that does not comprise s i . Therefore, for every request vector t i = (t
i for all j and v i (t i ) = 0 otherwise. The bid a i places on s i is denoted by b i (s i ) or simply b i , which together with s i forms a i 's bid request (s i , b i ). We assume that an agent only submits one bid request. If an agent may submit multiple requests (i.e., OR bids [19] ), we can treat A as a set of requests rather than agents. If an agent is allowed to submit but not to win multiple requests (i.e., XOR bids [19] ), we may manually add mutual-exclusive relation between each pair of requests submitted by the same agent 1 .
A. Winner Determination Problem
Given a set of bid requests
, the winner determination problem (WDP) is to find a setting of X = (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n ), where x i ∈ {0, 1} for all i, that maximizes the total winning bid
subject to the resource capacity constraint defined as
For single-unit CA, the WDP an instance of the maximum weight set packing problem, which is known to be NPhard [11] . Some approaches guarantee optimality but may be time-inefficient for some problem instances [19] , [21] . Some approaches are time-efficient and achieve optimality by restricting the form or size of bid requests [22] . Some approaches use heuristic or approximation techniques for time efficiency but not optimality. Hoos and Boutilier [23] used stochastic local search algorithm as an approximation to WDP. Zurel and Nisan [24] also proposed an approximation which runs the linear-programming relaxation of the packing problem and then refines the solution by local improvements in the order of bids (hill-climbing). The hill-climbing concept was also adopted by Fukuta and Ito [25] to improve the performance of a simple greedy approach [16] . They also considered the use of simulated annealing technique. Other approximation approaches include dynamic programming [3] and genetic algorithm [26] .
In this paper, we mainly consider approximations that use a BRF to define a total order ≺ on {(
. Algorithm 1 shows the general framework for greedy allocations which examine all bid requests in the order defined by ≺ to determine whether each request can be granted.
Let (s k , b k ) be the request that ranks first in B 5:
There have been many BRFs proposed for single-unit CA. The BRF proposed by Lehmann et al. [16] favors a request that maximizes normalized bid value defined as
where α is a configurable parameter. Mito and Fujita [27] considered several possible BRFs inspired by the heuristics for the maximum weighted independent set (MWIS) problem [28] . Let N i be the set of all conflicting requests for request
One such BRF sets a priority defined as
where β is a configurable parameter. Another BRF considered by them is
where
Function φ(·) alone could also be a BRF. Not too many approaches have been proposed for multiunit CA. Leyton-Brown et al. [20] proposed an optimal WDP algorithm. This algorithm uses techniques like branch-andbound and dynamic programming, which makes it difficult to be decentralized. As an approach to allocating fine-grained spectrum resources, Jia et al. [29] generalized the BRF w s (·) defined in (3) to multi-unit CAs. The proposed BRF is
The same BRF has also been used for the allocation of virtual machine instances in clouds [30] , [31] . The work in [32] generalized the BRF to consider scarcity of resources with α = 0.5. Mashayekhy et al. [5] considered the following BRF for a bid request in a unit of time.
Some BRFs for single-unit CA like (4) do not consider the number of resource instances. When being used in multi-unit CA, these BRFs may perform poorly. BRFs like (5) and (6) have not yet been extended to handle multi-unit resources. A possible extension is to replace |S i ∩ S j | in (6) with some matching term like s i · s j .
B. Pricing Scheme
The VCG mechanism generalizes the second-price scheme to ensure truthful bidding in CAs. VCG demands that each winner a i in VCG has to pay the social opportunity cost (i.e., the reduction of the total winning bid excluding a i 's) due to the presence of a i 's request. Suppose that we have a set of request pairs
⊆ B be a set of winning requests with the highest total bid given B. Each winning request
. VCG payment has been used in [33] . VCG is economically efficient but computationally infeasible because computing W (B) is NP-hard.
For BRF-based winner determination designed for singleunit CA, Lehmann et al. [16] defined monotonicity property for BRF, which states that the BRF gives (S j , b j ) a rank equal to or higher than that of
has the monotonicity property. BRFs w n (·), w φ (·), and φ(·) do not ensure monotonicity because it is possible that
as long as the set N i remains unchanged for both S i and S i .
The monotonicity property can be generalized for multiunit CA as follows. Let
. . , m}. Define binary relation < on S as s i < s j if s i ≤ s j and s i = s j . A BRF is monotone if it gives (s j , b j ) a rank equal to or higher than that of (s i , b i ) whenever s j ≤ s i and b j ≥ b i . By this definition, both w m (·) and w d (·) are monotone.
An allocation of resources among single-minded bidders is exact if each bidder a i is allocated either its request S i (if a i wins) or nothing (otherwise) [16] . We also assume the exactness property for our multi-unit CA.
For a BRF-based winner determination for single-unit CA with both the exactness and monotonicity properties, it is proved [16] that there is a critical value c i for each b i such that a i gets S i if b i > c i and a i gets nothing if b i < c i .
For example, assume that (S i , b i ) is a winning request and (S j , b j ) is the request that has the highest rank in the set of requests that do not win because of the presence of
On the other hand, (S i , b i ) would not be a winning request if
Therefore,
It is not difficult to see that a critical value also exists for each bidder in a multi-unit CA with the same setting.
In a sealed-bid auction, agents simultaneously submit sealed bids to an auctioneer, who then determines the set of winners and their associated payments. Agents in this case have no information about other bids. If a BRF-based winner determination is used for which the criticality property holds, then the following pricing scheme ensures truthful bidding in a sealedbid CA [16] .
C. Decentralized Mechanisms
In the literature, decentralized auctions sometimes refer to the idea of decoupling the WDP into subproblems each solved by a local agent. Each agent solves its locally constrained utility maximization problem, but an auctioneer is still needed to collect and update bidding information for coordinating an iterative auction [34] . Parkes [35] proposed an ascending-price auction protocol which executes in rounds. At the start of every round, the auctioneer announces a provisional allocation of bundles to bidders as well as new prices for another set of bundles. Brewer [17] proposed an auction protocol where participants may place higher bids on known bundles or propose alternative allocations to earn bonus.
Esteva and Padget [36] proposed a decentralized approach to WDP based on leader election protocol running on a ring overlay network. Their approach targets at single-item auction so there is only one winner. Lewis et al. [37] proposed a decentralized adaptive pricing scheme for sellers to determine best selling prices in a posted-price model, where sellers announce prices and buyers decide the quantities to purchase from each seller. They considered a single type of quantitatively-divisible resource.
Choi et al. [8] proposed two decentralized auctions for the assignment of different tasks to a fleet of robotic agents. One of these auctions assigns each agent multiple tasks. The auction consists of two phases. In the first phase, each agent independently and incrementally constructs its own bundle of tasks and place their bids on tasks based on the rewards (i.e., utilities) they may receive from the bundle. By exchanging information with all other participants, a bidder knows the most up-to-date standing bid on each task and may add an additional task into its bundle with a higher standing bid for this task. Because bidders construct their bundles independently, they may have conflicting collections of tasks. The second phase resolves possible bundle conflicts by applying a set of arbitration rules.
As a result, some agent needs to release all the tasks contained in her bundle, and the algorithm returns to the first phrase.
Our approaches differ from the approaches by Choi et al. [8] in the following points. First, their approaches assume that bidders are intrinsically truthful, while ours does not. Second, bidders in their approaches dynamically form their bundles and bids, while bidders in our approaches are single-minded. Third, our winner-determination approaches guarantee a conflict-free consensus, so no extra conflict-resolution phase is needed to re-examine the assignment result. Fourth, every task in [8] should be assigned, but this is not a requirement in our approaches. Finally, our approaches consider multi-unit CAs, not only single-unit CAs.
III. THE PROPOSED APPROACH
Designing a decentralized multi-unit CA faces several challenges. The first one is how each bidder locally determines whether the bidder herself is a winner according to the given BRF. It is not trivial because bidders competing for a common resource may be winners at the same time. The second challenge is to ensure that bidder interactions do not cause instability of the whole auction scheme, i.e., all bidders reach to a consensus on the set of final winners despite the fact that bidder may quit bidding or revise its bid request as a reaction to a change of another bid request. The third challenge is to make each bidder independently figure out how much it should pay for the auction.
A. Dynamic Multi-unit CA Game
In the proposed framework, bidder independently sets up bid request and then notifies all competitors of that setting. The setting may cause the competitors to make their own moves. Because notifications take arbitrary time and there is no synchronization scheme to coordinate bidder's moves, bidders make moves one after another in a non-deterministic manner. We thus model multi-unit CA as a dynamic game. In contrast, bidders in sealed-bid CAs place their bids without bidding information of any others, rendering it a static (oneshot) game.
We assume a monotone BRF for winner determination, which defines a total order
. We also assume exact allocation and single-minded bidders. Therefore, a single-minded a i has no incentive to submit s i < s i if a i desires s i because v i (s i ) = 0. On the other hand, if a i submits s i such that s i < s i , the probability of winning its request is lowered (due to the monotonicity property) without increasing its payoff. Therefore, agent a i has no incentive to manipulate s i and does not change s i during the auction: a i submits (s i , b i ) for the first bid request and b i only for all subsequent bid requests. In open ascending-price auctions and other decentralized auctions [17] , [35] , [38] , agents can only raise their bids. We take the same assumption.
Besides setting up bid requests, bidders also need to declare whether they themselves are winners and notify their competitors of the declarations. The notification is needed because bid requests alone do not suffice for the competitors to make their decisions. For example, suppose that a 6 in Fig. 1 
We use x i to denote a i 's declaration, where x i = 1 if a i declares a win and x i = 0 otherwise. In the proposed game,
It is a concern whether x i 's are correct regarding the resource capacity constraint and the BRF. For this, we extend the definition of critical value for single-unit CA in [16] to multi-unit CAs as follows.
and {x j |j = i}, the critical value of b i is c i if
when b i > c i , and Let p i be the price that a i has to pay at the end of the auction. The utility of a i is defined to be a i 's payoff in the auction:
Intuitively, a i 's utility is her valuation on s i minus her payment p i if a i declares a win, and zero otherwise. We assume critical-value-based payment (i.e., p i = c i ). If a i does not declare a win, a i gets zero utility by (14) . If a i declares a win (i.e. x i = 1), a i 's utility is u i = v i (s i ) − c i . It appears that a i can declare x i without setting up a matching b i . However, a i has no incentive to declare x i = 0 if a i in fact wins (i.e., b i > c i ). On the other hand, if a i declares
for some s k i = 0. Any agent a j with s k j > 0 can detect this. We assume that there is some penalty imposed on bidders who get caught cheating on x i , so a i has no incentive to declare x i = 1 if a i in fact loses (i.e., b i < c i ). However, a i could set up x i and b i at the same time to win an auction. It can be deduced that a i 's best response (the setting of b i and x i ) depends on the relationship between v i = v i (s i ) and c i :
B. Decentralized BRF-based Winner Determination
We now describe the details of the proposed decentralized winner determination scheme. This scheme works for both first-price auction and auctions with critical-value-based payment.
Each agent a i in the scheme is free to set up b i and x i . Different agents may have different ideas about how to place their initial bids, so we assume that b i is an arbitrary value in [0, v i ] initially. The initial value of x i is not important, so it could be either 0 or 1. We assume that each agent a i broadcasts (s i , b i , x i ) to all other agents in the beginning of the scheme so each agent a i has knowledge of N i , B, and x = (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n ) initially.
Our approach demands that each agent a i maintains a local copy of b j and x j for each a j ∈ N i . When a i receives a new update of b j and x j from another agent a j , it executes Algorithm 2 as a response. a i first updates its knowledge about b j and x j , and checks whether a i can win with its current bid by identifying a i 's key predecessor. 
if ci + < vi then : minimum allowable increment 9:
else bi ≤ ci and ci ≥ vi send update(bi, xi) to each aj ∈ Ni
17:
end if 18: end Definition 2 (Key Predecessor): If a i can win with its current bid, a i 's key predecessor is a i itself. Otherwise, a i 's key predecessor is a k if (s k , b k ) is the request that ranks the lowest among all winning requests whose absence alone would make
If a i 's key predecessor is a k = a i , we have (s k , b k ) ≺ (s i , b i ) and a k must a neighboring node of a i in the conflict graph. Algorithm 3 details how to identify the key predecessor for a i . If a i cannot win with its current bid, a i finds out its critical value c i , i.e., the minimal value of b i that allows (s i , b i ) to outrank (s k , b k ). Assuming q = (3, 2, 2, 2, 2) and the BRF defined in (7) with α = 1, Table I shows an example of key predecessors and critical values. The key predecessor of a 3 is a 2 because (s 3 , b 3 ) would be granted if (s 2 , b 2 ) were not present. To let (s 3 , b 3 ) outrank (s 2 , b 2 ), b 3 should be greater than
Therefore, a 3 's critical value c 3 is 93.33. The key predecessor of a 5 is a 1 because only the absence of a 1 's request alone can make a 5 's request granted. Neither a 2 nor a 4 is a 5 's key predecessor.
Algorithm 3 Procedure key predecessor(i, B, x)
1: Ni ← {aj|(ai, aj) is an edge in the conflict graph} 2: C ← {(sj, bj)|aj ∈ Ni ∧ xj = 1 ∧ (sj, bj) ≺ (si, bi)} 3: total unit[k] ← 0 for all k ∈ {1, . . . , m} 4: while C = ∅ do
5:
Let (sj, bj) be the request that has the highest rank in C 6:
for all k ∈ {1, . . . , m} do 7:
return j 
C. Stabilization, Correctness, and Consistency
In this subsection, we analyze whether the proposed protocol stabilizes, and, if it does, whether the outcome is correct and consistent.
The protocol may potentially not stabilize because every time a i changes b i or x i , the rank of its bid request in terms of ≺ and thus the key predecessors of other bidders may change. That may cause another bidder's reaction and change the set of (declared) winners. For convergence, we consider first how each agent's knowledge about bids and winner declarations evolves with time. Let b 
) is a transition path of agent a i that is of length t.
Line 9 in Algorithm 2 is the only place for a i to change its bid, which is conditioned on the relationship between c i and v i (Line 8). Clearly, agents can only raise their bids and no agent places a bid higher than its valuation. can only raise their bids and no agent places a bid higher than its valuation, there exists some integer t i such that b
. . , b n ) no longer changes when t ≥ t i . Although the values of t i may be different for different a i 's, eventually b t i will stabilize for all a i 's. After that, the rank of bid requests is finalized. Without loss of generality, assume that (s j , b j ) ≺ (s j+1 , b j+1 ) for all 1 ≤ j < n. We already know that no bidder a j has the incentive to cheat on x j . It follows that the value of x 1 will eventually stabilize. Because of this, the value of x 2 will eventually stabilize, and so on. Therefore, ξ i must be finite.
When the protocol stabilizes, the outcome (i.e., the collective settings of b i 's and x i 's) is correct if it meets the capacity constraint and conforms to the BRF-based winnerdetermination rule defined below.
Definition 3 (BRF-based Winner Determination Rule): Let ≺ be a total order defined by a BRF on bid requests
. An outcome of the CA X = (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n ) conforms to the BRF-based winner determination rule if for every x i , where 1 ≤ i ≤ n, x i = 1 only if
More than one outcomes may conform to the BRF-based winner determination rule. For example, if two bidders can both win regardless of their relative ranks, then we can yield another confirming outcome by switching their ranking places in a known confirming outcome.
Lemma 1: Let a j be a i 's key predecessor returned by Algorithm 3. If j = i and a i increases b i to some value that makes
Proof: Since j = i, Algorithm 3 returns its value in Line 9. This implies that
Therefore, if a i increases b i to some value to make (s i , b i ) outrank (s j , b j ), then (18) 
For the latter case, we also have (19) by Lemma 1. We thus have the proof. Theorem 3: Algorithm 2 meets the resource capacity constraint specified in (2), i.e., 
Consequently, the ranks of bid requests in these two algorithms can be different. Table II shows an example where b = {9, 13, 10}. Here we show a particular transition sequence when running Algorithm 2, where a 2 stops raising b 2 and turns x 2 to 0 as soon as it realizes that c 2 = 14 > v 2 due to the setting of b 1 = 7. The knowledge of x 2 = 0 in turn causes a 3 to stop at b 3 = 3 with the declaration of x 3 = 1. As a result, the a 3 's request is ranked higher than a 1 's in Algorithm 1 but lower than it in Algorithms 2.
Despite of the difference in ranks, we shall prove that Algorithm 2 is consistent in the sense that it identifies the same set of winners as Algorithm 1 using the same BRF. 
(1, 1) 13 13 8 a 3 (0, 1) 10 10 3
Theorem 4: Given b and b as defined above, let x = (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n ) and x = (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n ) be two vectors that represent the auction results of Algorithms 2 and 1, respectively, where (s i , b i ) ) is granted by Algorithm 2 (resp. Algorithm 1). If these two algorithms use the same BRF, then
Proof: Without loss of generality, we assume that
. Let c = (c 1 , c 2 , . . . , c n ) and c = (c 1 , c 2 , . . . , c n ) be two vectors that represent the critical values for (b, x) and (b , x ), respectively. We shall prove the theorem by induction on i.
Basis
Step 
Because (s k , v k ) ranks k -th in B and 
Consider the set
By the inductive hypothesis, we have x j = x j for any request
If all requests in B k still outrank (s k , b k ) in B, x k must be 0 by (22) . Otherwise, let C denote the set of all requests in B k that rank lower than (s k , b k ) in B and let (s j , b j ) ∈ C be the one that ranks the lowest in C.
} be the set of all requests in B k that outrank (s j , b j ) in B. Because x j = 1 and x p = 1 for every (s p , b p ) ∈ O j by the inductive hypothesis, we have
Because (23) can be rewritten as
The only way to make both (22) and (24) true is x k = 0.
D. Critical-Value-Based Payment
In the proposed approach, each winner a i independently figures out how much she should pay for the auction. The problem is trivial for first-price auctions (p i = b i ). For the critical-value-based payment, the problem is to identify a i 's key successor.
Definition 4 (Key Successor): Let a i be a winner. Bidder a k = a i is a i 's key successor if (s k , b k ) is the request that has the highest rank among all non-winning requests which would be granted if (s i , b i ) were not present. If there is no such request, a i 's key successor is defined to be a i itself.
If a i 's key successor is a k = a i , a i 's payment p i is the minimal value of b i that makes the rank of (s i , b i ) equal to or higher than that of (s k , b k ). If a i 's key successor is a i itself, then p i = 0.
Let us revisit the example shown in Table I . Table III shows the key successor and payment, respectively, for each winner. The key successor for a 2 is a 3 because (s 3 , b 3 ) would be granted if (s 2 , b 2 ) were not present. For (s 2 , b 2 ) to outrank (s 3 , b 3 ), b 2 should be greater than
Therefore, a 2 's payment p 2 is 69.75. The key successor for a 1 is a 1 itself because neither a 3 's nor a 5 's request would be granted if a 1 's request were not present. Therefore, a 1 's payment is 0.
The relationship between key predecessor and key successor is not symmetric: a 1 is a 5 's key predecessor in Table I but a 5 is not a 1 's key successor here.
Algorithm 4 details how to identify the key successor for a i . for all k ∈ {1, . . . , m} do 5:
end for 7: end for 8: D ← {(sj, bj)|(si, bi) ≺ (sj, bj)} 9: while D = ∅ do 10: Let (sj, bj) be the request that has the highest rank in D
11:
if xj = 1 then 12:
else a conflicting, non-winning request 14 : 
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS
We conducted simulations to evaluate the performance of the proposed scheme in terms of total winning bid, total payment, and the time to convergence. We assume n bidders and m types of items. For supply side, the number of identical instances for any resource type r j , q j , is distributed over the set of integers in the range [1, q max ], where q max is a fixed number. For demand side, the probability that any agent a i requests any resource type r j is a tunable parameter p s . If a i does request r j , s j i is distributed over the set of integers in the range [1, q j ]. Let v i,j be a i 's valuation on one instance of resource type r j . The set {v i,j } n i=1 follows a Gaussian distribution truncated at 0 and 50 with mean µ j , where µ j is a random variable uniformly distributed over the range [10, 20] . Agent a i 's evaluation on s i is set to
As mentioned, the proposed approach does not demand particular initial value of each x i . We thus tested three possible settings for the initial values of x i 's: all 1's, all 0's, and randomly selected 1's and 0's. For each possible setting, we generated 100 test data and performed 10 trials for each data. Each result is an average over these 1000 trials.
A factor that affects the performance metrics is competition intensity (CI), the ratio of the total number of edges in the conflict graph to the maximum (i.e., n(n − 1)/2). We fixed m, n, and q max , and varied the value of p s from 0.01 to 0.14 to adjust CI. Fig. 2a shows how CI changes with increasing p s .
We used two BRFs for our simulations: w m with α = 1 and w n with β = 0.5. When CI increases, the numbers of winners identified with both BRFs decrease, as Fig. 2b shows. Here w m slightly outperformed w n due to its consideration of the number of instances in the function definition. For a specific BRF, the centralized greedy approach and the proposed decentralized approach yielded exactly the same set of winners. Figure 3 shows how total winning bid changes with respect to p s . For both BRFs, the centralized approach outperformed the decentralized counterpart, and the performance of the decentralized approach was not affected by the initial setting of x i 's. Although there were more winners with p s = 0.01 than with p s ≥ 0.02 in both BRFs, the total winning bid with p s = 0.01 was not always higher than that with p s ≥ 0.02. The reason is that although there were more winners with p s = 0.01 than with p s ≥ 0.02, each winner with p s = 0.01 generally requested fewer resource instances than that with p s ≥ 0.02. Because each agent's bid was roughly in proportional to the number of requested instances, we obtained the highest total winning bid with p s = 0.02 or p s = 0.03. When p s increased further, the total winning bid decreased because the number of winners decreased significantly as Fig. 2b indicates. Figure 4 show how the total payment changes with increasing CI. Here all approaches exhibit behaviors similar to the result of total winning bid. However, the total payment is always lower then the total winning bid under any circumstance. The performance gap between the centralized and the proposed decentralized approach becomes smaller when CI is smaller. This trend is also similar to that exhibited in Fig. 3 .
We studied the convergence time of the decentralized approach by measuring the total number of moves taken by all bidders before reaching the final result. We did not count the initial setting and broadcast of bid requests; only changes of bid requests (sendings of updates) count. Fig. 5 shows the results, which clearly depend on the initial settings of x i 's. Generally speaking, the all-1s initial setting demanded fewer moves than the all-0s initial setting when there were more winners (i.e., when p s is small). On the other hand, the all-0s initial setting outperformed the all-0s initial setting when there were few winners (i.e., when p s is large). The random setting generally lies between these two extremes, and would be the best choice if we do not know the CI value beforehand. Regardless of the initial setting of x i 's, on average each agent took fewer than two moves before stability.
V. CONCLUSIONS
We have proposed a decentralized BRF-based winner determination and payment scheme. It allows bidders to locally determine their bid and willingness to win by identifying their key predecessors. By exchanging that information with other competitors, other bidders can take moves so as to reach a consensus. Winners determines their payments by identifying their respective key successors. We have proved that the proposed approach eventually stabilizes and is correct in the sense that the result meets the capacity constraint and conforms to the BRF-based winner-determination rule. We also proved that the proposed approach is consistent with the centralized counterpart using the same BRF because both approaches identify the same set of winners. Simulation results confirms the correctness and consistency of the proposed approach at the cost of lower total winning bid and payment. 
